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Lending an “Invisible Hand” to
the Navy: Armed Guards
as a Free Market Assistance to
Defeating Piracy
Brittany E. Pizor *
Piracy may be viewed to have a romantic past but modern
piracy is a serious problem facing the world today. As it
becomes increasingly prevalent, piracy harms the world economy
with increased costs and dangers to the shipping industry. To
assist navies in preventing and deterring piracy, the free market
should be allowed to provide private security measures, such as
armed guards, to assist in anti-piracy efforts. However, shipping
companies cannot invoke the services of private security
companies’ armed guards until countries dismantle legal
barriers. Right now, countries have anti-gun laws that restrict
flagships from having guns on board and coastal countries have
anti-gun policies restricting ships passing through their
territorial waters from enlisting the help of armed guards.
Additionally, armed guards cannot be protected by a self-defense
claim if they kill a pirate attempting to attack their ship. To best
dismantle these laws, an organization, such as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), should create cohesive, unified
policies outlining the requirements and restrictions for ships
carrying armed guards. With the support of the IMO, these new
regulations can make it possible for merchant ships to protect
themselves from pirates and hijackings. This will in turn bolster
the efforts of navies and alleviate pressure on the world
economy.
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I.

Introduction

On the night of December 5th, 2001, pirates stormed a 130-foot
expedition vessel off the coast of Brazil. 1 Pirates ran through the
vessel shouting and demanding money. 2 Soon, gunfire broke out, and
Sir Peter Blake was shot twice in the back. The pirates stole cameras
1.

See Herb McCormick, On Yachting; Peter Blake’s Legacy Spans the
World, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/
12/07/sports/on-yachting-peter-blake-s-legacy-spans-the-world.html
(describing the accomplishments and legacy of Sir Peter Black).

2.

See Salt of Earth and Ocean America’s Cup Hero and Environmentalist
Sir Peter Blake is Murdered by Brazilian Pirates, TIME, Dec. 17, 2001,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2047863,00.html.
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and Omega watches 3 and left one of the world’s greatest yachtsmen
dead at age fifty three. 4 Blake’s friend, Australian yachtsman Chris
Packer, learned a hard lesson that night. Thus, three years later,
when Chris embarked on his around-the-world tour, he made sure to
carry firearms to repel pirates. 5 Twice pirates boarded his ship and
twice Packer used his firearms for protection. 6 While in port in Bali,
Indonesia, government officials boarded Packer’s yacht and arrested
him for gun running, a capital offense. 7 Packer sat in a Bali jail
uncertain if he would face a firing squad. After three long months, the
Indonesian government set Packer free. 8
Today, piracy is becoming more prevalent and dangerous. 9
Modern piracy is more serious than the piracy of the 1800s because
instead of focusing on robbery and taking vessels, pirates now take
hostages for high ransoms. 10 Pirate attacks doubled in 2008, 11 and
again in 2009. 12 In 2010, pirate attacks decreased in number; however,
total ransoms increased, making piracy as profitable as ever.13 The
year 2011 closed with 439 pirate attacks and forty-five hijackings
worldwide. 14 As of March 2013, forty-four pirate attacks had already
been attempted. 15 As shocking as these statistics are, even more
3.

Funeral of Yachting Hero, BBC, Dec. 14, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk
/2/hi/uk_news/england/1710485.stm

4.

See McCormick, supra note 1.

5.

See John Velleco, Gun Control on the High Seas, GUN OWNERS OF
AMERICA (Apr. 13, 2009, 15:38), http://gunowners.org/gun-control-onthe-high-seas.htm.

6.

See id.

7.

See id.

8.

See id.

9.

See Roger Williams University, Piracy and International Law Panel
featuring Eugene Kontorovich, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=eDqJJ0eYk1M [hereinafter Piracy Panelist].

10.

See Jennifer S. Martin, Fighting Piracy with Private Security Measures:
When Contract Law Should Tell Parties to Walk the Plank, 59 AM. U.
L. REV. 1363, 1367 (2010).

11.

Piracy Panelist, supra note 9.

12.

Matt Brown, Somali Pirate Attacks Nearly Double in 2009, THE
NATIONAL (UAE), Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.thenational.ae/news/
world/africa/somali-pirate-attacks-nearly-double-in-2009.

13.

Piracy Panelist, supra note 9.

14.

Piracy Attacks in East and West Africa Dominate World Report, ICC
COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.iccccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures.

15.

Piracy & Armed Robbery News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME
SERVS., http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigu
res (last updated Feb. 27, 2013).
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shocking is the fact that these incidents often go unreported.16
Countries do not report pirate attacks for fear of being seen as having
a “piracy problem,” 17 while ship owners simply pay ransoms to avoid
insurance hikes. 18 Moreover, the extreme duress caused by pirate
attacks often makes victim accounts unreliable, causing attack reports
to be even more undependable. 19
The current method of defeating piracy through interdiction alone
cannot be successful. Navy patrols have limited effectiveness because
navies cannot be omnipresent. 20 Capturing pirates is difficult;
prosecuting and punishing them is even harder. 21 Universal
jurisdiction should theoretically make pirate prosecutions easy, but
few countries are willing to prosecute pirates. 22 If pirates are found
guilty, the country that hosted the trial must find an appropriate
punishment. 23 However, the punishment is usually more luxurious
than the lifestyle of a pirate, thereby creating a reverse deterrent
effect. 24
This Note focuses on the need for commercial ships to take
proactive measures against piracy by hiring armed guards and the
benefits and legal obstacles of doing so. Initially, this Note explains
the reemergence of piracy in modern society. Next, it examines the
importance of navy efforts to address piracy. While these efforts are
16.

See id.

17.

Ursula Daxecker & Brandon Prins, Insurgents of the Sea: Institutional
and Economic Opportunities for Maritime Piracy 13 (unpublished
article), available at http://ursuladaxecker.weebly.com/uploads/2/6/1/8
/2618117/prins_and_daxecker_04-18-11.pdf.

18.

See id.

19.

Id.

20.

Lucas Bento, Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How
the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law Enables Piracy to Flourish, 29
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 399, 410 (2011) (noting that the navy cannot
protect each of the 33,000 cargo ships that pass over a million square
miles of pirate rich waters).

21.

See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. Navies only have a ten to fifteen
minute window in which pirates can be captured before committing an
attack. Id.

22.

See id. (noting that 90% of captured pirates are released). Western
countries find it difficult to adapt their criminal trials to an irregular
criminal force. Trial expenses accumulate quickly when witnesses and
evidence are rarely close to a nation capable of prosecuting pirates. Few
countries are willing to pay for this cost. Id.

23.

See id.

24.

See id. When in prison convicted pirates have warm shelter and good
food. Once released from prison, pirates claim asylum in the country
they were held. This is particularly a problem in Europe where the
pirates are usually out of prison before their thirtieth birthday. Id.
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necessary, this Note demonstrates why navies cannot be the sole
defense mechanism against piracy and why armed guards must be
utilized. Accordingly, countries must change their domestic gun laws
for flagships and ports while enabling armed guards to use selfdefense. This Note advocates for a collective diplomatic approach to
adopt unified regulations for ships with armed guards to follow.
Finally, this Note will explain why critics’ fears that this solution will
lead to increased violence by “mercenaries” are unfounded.

II. PIRACY REEMERGES IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY
After the heyday of piracy in the late seventeenth and early
eighteenth centuries, it nearly disappeared. 25 Piracy had previously
been encouraged by states as a way to attack enemies, 26 but in the
late seventeenth century, naval wars ended and the need for statesponsored piracy ceased. 27 Countries began treating piracy as a
crime 28 and navies began targeting pirates. 29
But in the 1980s, the explosion of world trade and shipping, made
piracy a profitable business again. 30 This reemergence first occurred
off the coast of Southeast Asia, particularly in the Strait of Malacca,
one the world’s key shipping routes. 31 This narrow body of water,
through which 50% of the world’s oil passes each year, makes the
strait an easy and profitable target for pirates. 32
Piracy next resurfaced off the coast of Somalia. 33 The country’s
weak government, poor economy, and lack of coastal police patrol
contributed to a swell in piracy. 34 Currently, three independent
governments fracture Somalia: Puntland, Transitional Federal
25.

See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 4–5.

26.

Lawrence Azubuike, International Law Regime Against Piracy, 15 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 43, 46 (2009) (noting the similarity to statesponsored terrorism today).

27.

Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More
Is Needed, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 378 (2010).

28.

See id.; see also Azubuike, supra note 26, at 46.

29.

See Sterio, supra note 27, at 378.

30.

See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5; see also Bruce A. Elleman &
Andrew Forbes, Introduction, in PIRACY AND MARITIME CRIME:
HISTORICAL AND MODERN CASE STUDIES 2 (2010) (noting the correlation
between trade and increase of piracy).

31.

See Sterio, supra note 27, at 381.

32.

See id. at 381–82 (describing numerous attacks that occurred in the
Strait of Malacca).

33.

Id. at 382.

34.

See Bento, supra note 20, at 405.
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Government (TFG), and Somaliland. 35 These governments have been
unsuccessful in their battle against pirates. 36 Puntland not only
harbors one of the major pirate organizations, but its leaders have
known ties to pirates. 37 The Somali TFG has internationally
recognized jurisdiction off its coast but it cannot control the
territory. 38 Somaliland most successfully fights against piracy, but it
lacks recognition as an independent country by any foreign
government. 39
Many individuals are attracted to piracy. Pirate recruits are often
from professions with transferrable maritime skills, such as fishermen,
sailors, and taxi-boat captains. 40 Decreased economic opportunities in
poor countries such as Somalia create an added incentive for these
individuals to turn to piratical acts. 41 Ninety percent of the world’s
trade travels on the slow, vulnerable merchant vessels that frequently
transit through tight trade routes, 42 allowing piracy to become a
successful and viable career choice, especially for those in economic
distress. 43
Piracy can be highly organized. 44 After September 11, 2001,
international authorities focused attention on preventing a similar
attack at sea. 45 Al-Qaeda showed its maritime terrorism capabilities

35.

Theodore T. Richard, Reconsidering the Letter of Marque: Utilizing
Private Security Providers Against Piracy, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 411, 443
(2010).

36.

See id. at 446.

37.

See id. at 443–46. Puntland made efforts to curtail piracy by hiring
private security companies, but the government hindered the security
companies’ success by supporting the piracy they hired the security
guards to defeat. Id.

38.

See id. at 443, 447.

39.

See id. at 449.

40.

See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 9–10.

41.

Id. at 10.

42.

See John S. Burnett, The Next 9/11 Could Happen at Sea, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/22/opinion/22bu
rnett.html (noting the Suez and Panama Canals, the Bab el Mandeb,
the Straits of Gibraltar and the Malacca Strait as “the world’s choke
points”).

43.

See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 11.

44.

See Tina Garmon, International Law of the Sea: Reconciling the Law of
Piracy and Terrorism in the Wake of September 11th, 27 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 257, 266 (2002) (discussing sophisticated piracy rings that fund
large operations).

45.

See id. at 273–74.
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with attacks on the USS Cole 46 and the French supertanker
Limburg. 47 Indonesian pirates also attacked the Dewi Madrim in
March of 2003. 48 Instead of being concerned with robbing the ship,
attackers took turns steering the ship down the congested Malacca
Strait. 49 The incident seemed like a practice run for a terrorist attack
by the Free Aceh Movement, an Indonesian separationist
organization. 50
Southeast Asia has become the new “hot-spot” for maritime
terrorism with three primary terrorist organizations: Abu Sayyaf,
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, and Jemaah Islamiyah. 51 Historical and
financial ties link al-Qaeda to Abu Sayyaf. 52 The region’s extensive
involvement in world trade makes terrorist activity especially
dangerous to the global economy. 53 While the motives of piracy may
be different for Somali pirates and maritime terrorists, the
international community must prevent both groups from committing
acts of violence at sea.

III. Sole Reliance on Navies to Prevent Piracy is
Inadequate
Navies around the world actively work to prevent and deter
piracy in the 2.5 million square miles of pirate-ridden waters. 54 By
2013, three anti-piracy patrols and approximately thirty navies
worked together to thwart pirate attacks. 55 The European Union
Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) began operations in December 2008 and
46.

See Katherine Zimmerman, Ten Years After 9/11: Al Qaeda’s
Reemergence in Yemen, CRITICAL THREATS PROJ.: AM. ENTERPRISE
INST. (Sept. 20, 1011), http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerma
n-qaeda-reemergence-september-20-2011. The bombing of the USS Cole
off the coast of Yemen killed seventeen Americans. Id.

47.

Sebastian Rotella & Esther Schrader, Tanker Blast Likely a Terror
Attack, French Say, LA TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, http://articles.latimes.
com/2002/oct/11/world/fg-tanker11. A small boat rammed the side of
the French oil tanker off the coast of Yemen. Id.

48.

See Burnett, supra note 42.

49.

See id.

50.

See id.

51.

See Rommel C. Banlaoi, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The
Abu Sayyaf Threat, NAVAL WAR COLL. REV., Autumn 2005, at 63.

52.

See id. at 65.

53.

See id. at 64. Four of the largest trade routes go through Southeast Asia
and the value of trade through the area is on the rise. Id.

54.

About CMF, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES, http://combinedmaritime
orces.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).

55.

Id.
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operates under the European Common Security and Defense Policy. 56
The EU NAVFOR conducts Operation ATALANTA, which includes
deterrence, prevention, and repression of pirate activities. 57 It protects
vessels in the World Food Programme and the African Union Mission
in Somali shipping routes. 58 Operation ATALANTA also assists in
monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. 59 Currently, the
EU NAVFOR consists of approximately 1,500 military personnel
operating navy vessels, maritime patrol, reconnaissance aircrafts, and
vessel protection detachment teams, in addition to their land-based
personnel. 60 The force patrols about 2 million nautical miles. 61
The multinational naval force, Combined Task Force 150, also
assists in piracy patrols. 62 The force was created at the beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom 63 and is tasked with counterterrorism
missions. 64 It now works to provide a stable and prosperous maritime
environment in the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red
Sea, and Indian Ocean. 65 France, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Pakistan, Canada, and Australia have taken part in
commanding Combined Task Force 150. 66
Combined Task Force 151 began in January 2009 as a counterpiracy force established so the U.S. Navy could work with nonwestern navies. 67 The Task Force first started as a partnership
between the United States, Korean, and Turkish navies 68 and is now
comprised of personnel from numerous coalition countries, 69 such as
56.

See Mission, EU NAVFOR SOMALIA, http://www.eunavfor.eu/aboutus/mission/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).

57.

Id.

58.

See id.

59.

See id. (noting that it only assists shipping on a case-by-case basis).

60.

See id.

61.

See id.

62.

See Combined Task Force (CTF) 150, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES,
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/150/index.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2013).

63.

See id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

See Combined Task Force 151, COMBINED MARITIME FORCES,
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/cmf/151/index.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2013).

68.

Id.

69.

Id.
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Pakistan and Denmark. 70 The Task Force operates counter-piracy
missions in approximately 1.1 million square miles in the Gulf of Aden
and off the eastern coast of Somalia. 71 China is one eastern nation
that does not work with this coalition force. 72 Rather, China primarily
focuses on protecting its own ships by sending armed convoy escorts. 73
The success of the international navy response is difficult to
measure because even though patrols have reduced the number of
successful attacks, pirates have increased their attempted attacks.74
Pirates are becoming more successful with the enlistment of modern
technology, such as satellite phones and GPS devices, along with the
use of previously hijacked ships used as “mother ships.” 75 Localized
successes in the Gulf of Aden have pushed pirates to expand their
attack zone outside of the navies’ reach. 76 This success would
disappear if navies leave the area or spread themselves too thin. 77
Additionally, navies cannot prevent pirate attacks occurring in
territorial waters where international law prevents them from
asserting jurisdiction. 78
70.

Denmark Assumes Command of Combined Task Force 151 Bahrain,
COMBINED MARITIME FORCES (Jan. 12, 2012), http://combinedmaritime
forces.com/2012/01/12/denmark-assumes-command-of-combined-taskforce-151-bahrain/.

71.

See Combined Task Force 151, supra note 67.

72.

See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, United States Navy (Nov. 14,
2011).

73.

James Warden, Combined Task Force 151 Hunts Down Pirates in the
Gulf of Aden, STARS AND STRIPES (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.
stripes.com/news/combined-task-force-151-hunts-down-pirates-in-thegulf-of-aden-1.89695. In 2010, China expanded their anti-piracy efforts
and joined forces with the United States, NATO, and the United
Nations. See China’s Anti-Piracy Role off Somalia Expands, BBC, Jan.
29, 2010 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8486502.stm; see also Mission,
supra note 56.

74.

See Christopher Alessi, Combating Maritime Piracy, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/france/combatingmaritime-piracy/p18376 (noting that even if the increase in patrols
reduce the number of attack, piracy is still on the rise).

75.

See Bento, supra note 20, at 406.

76.

See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72. LCDR Berube
described the effect of the navies’ efforts in one area to the air in a
balloon being pushed. It does not go away; it will simply move to
another area. Id.

77.

See Alessi, supra note 74 (explaining how even though the patrols are
effective, they are treating the symptoms and not the root cause of the
problems, the instability in Somalia).

78.

See George D. Gabal, Jr., Smoother Seas Ahead: Draft Guidelines as an
Intentional Solution to Modern-Day Piracy, 81 TUL. L. REV. 1433, 1442
(2007) (discussing how UNCLOS does not apply in territorial waters).
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While navy efforts have helped prevent successful pirate attacks,
navies are better equipped to fight war, not crime. 79 Long-standing
naval tradition focuses on conflict between countries. 80 Navies are not
equipped to protect every ship traversing the high seas. Moreover,
countries often reject naval escorts through pirate-infested waters
because the cost to a navy is too high. 81 With a limited resources,
funding, and personnel, navies cannot defeat piracy on their own. 82

IV. Free Market Solutions, Such as Armed Guards to
Protect Ships, Should Be Allowed to Assist Navies by
Serving as Deterrents Against Piracy
Limited capabilities and resources restrict countries’ abilities to
use navies to enforce security measures against piracy. 83 The navies’
inability to be omnipresent and protect all ships traveling through
pirate-infested waters opens up a lucrative market for private security
companies. 84 Private security options can alleviate the high costs that
piracy creates for governments and shipping companies. 85 With
private security measures, the cost of lost goods and ransoms
79.

See Peter Andreas & Richard Price, From War Fighting to Crime
Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State, INT’L
STUD. REV., Fall 2001, at 31, 32 (discussing how the militaries have
traditionally focused on countries in war fights); Colonel Robert B.
Killebrew, Crime and War, U.S. NAVAL INST. (Oct. 2011),
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-10/crime-and-war
(noting the military’s most important change right now is shifting their
focus to fight “crime, terrorism, and insurgency”).

80.

See Andreas & Price, supra note 79, at 31, 32; Killebrew, supra note 79.

81.

See, e.g., Catherine Bolsover, Germany is Close to Deploying
‘Mercenaries’ to Protect Ships from Pirates, DW (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.dw.de/germany-is-close-to-deploying-mercenaries-toprotect-ships-from-pirates/a-15325923-1.

82.

See Ron Paul: Responses to Piracy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 21, 2009),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Da15g61L1Wk.

83.

See Richard, supra note 35, at 417 (discussing the demands of private
security to assist the government); see also Daniel Straub, Outsourcing
Human Security: Private Security Companies and Peacekeeping 15
(APSA Annual Meeting Paper, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902525 (noting that the United
Nations, countries acting individually, or countries acting collectively
cannot solve all the world’s problems).

84.

See Andrew J. Shapiro, Ass’t Sec’y, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs,
Remarks to the Defense Trade Advisory Group (Nov. 9, 2011), available
at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/176925.htm.

85.

See Richard, supra note 35, at 417. The shipping industry suffers from
high insurance premiums, costly delays and diversions, and extortionate
ransom demands. Id.
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disappears and insurance rates decrease, sometimes up to 40%. 86 The
U.S. Navy encourages ships to take advantage of these proactive
security measures. 87
Private security measures are effective in combating piracy. 88 To
date, pirates have not successfully taken a ship protected by armed
security guards. 89 With an onboard, armed security team, a ship’s
crew is protected without using the U.S. Navy’s resources. The
Maersk Alabama provides a telling example of the success that private
armed guards have protecting ships. 90 In April 2009, the U.S. naval
destroyer, the USS Bainbridge, came to the rescue of the Maersk
Alabama after pirates took over the ship. 91 At the time, the ship had
no onboard security team. 92 In order to free the ship’s captain, who
the pirates took hostage in the attack, the Navy Seal snipers killed
the three captors. 93 In November 2009, pirates again attempted to
attack the Maersk Alabama. 94 This time, an onboard security team,
using small firearms, acoustical devices, and evasive maneuvers,
fended off the attack. 95
Shipping companies are beginning to understand the importance
and success of preventative measures and are actively seeking armed
guards. 96 However, armed security guards must follow the regulations
86.

See Katharine Houreld, AP IMPACT: Security Firms Joining Somali
Piracy Fight, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/
news/world/2008-10-26-2583935117_x.htm (explaining how recently
insurance rates skyrocketed for ships traveling through pirate infested
waters, but insurance companies slash rates for ships who hire armed
guards).

87.

See id. (noting the spokesman for the Baharin-based United States 5th
Fleet, Lieutenant Nate Christensen, supports the proactive safety
measures offered by the free market).

88.

See Shapiro, supra note 84 (announcing the United States support for
the use of armed guards because they have proven to be successful).

89.

Id.

90.

See Maersk Alabama Crew Recalls Pirate Attack, USA TODAY, Apr. 17,
2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-16-piratesN.htm.

91.

See id.

92.

See id.

93.

See id.

94.

See Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pi
rates.html.

95.

See id.

96.

See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72; see also Gus
Trompiz, Marine Insurers Backing Armed Guards as Piracy Threat
Grows, INSURANCE J., Sep. 20, 2011, http://www.insurance
journal.com/news/international/2011/09/20/216642.htm (noting how
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of the flagship country, territorial waters, and ports they travel
through. 97 Some countries have begun to change gun laws for both the
flagships and territorial waters, recognizing the need for laws allowing
armed guards to utilize the legal defense of self-defense. 98 Private
security firms cannot enhance the navies’ efforts until these legal
barriers have been dismantled.
A.

Legal Barriers Make It Difficult for Shipping Companies to Hire
Armed Guards to Protect Ships.

1.

Gun control laws make it difficult for merchant ships to allow
armed guards to accompany ships.

Ships are subject to many different laws and regulations that
hinder their ability to hire armed guards. 99 Countries exercise
jurisdiction over ships that sail under their flag, 100 and coastal
countries exercise jurisdiction over ships that innocently pass through
their territorial waters, 101 which includes coastal countries’ ability to
exercise limited criminal jurisdiction over ships. 102 For example, a
country may impose criminal liability on a ship’s crewmembers for
disruption of the peace. 103 If a ship is attacked by pirates in a
country’s territorial waters and a pirate is killed in the squabble, both
the flag state and the territorial state can exercise criminal
jurisdiction. 104 If just one of these jurisdictions prohibits guns,
merchant ships will be unable to hire armed guards.

shipping companies were first reluctance to hire armed guards because
of potential legal liabilities).
97.

See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (defines the rights and responsibilities for
vessels at sea) [hereinafter UNCLOS].

98.

See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72 (noting the
recent changes in laws).

99.

See The Swedish Club, Piracy & Use of Armed Guards: General
Overview 3–5 (Members’ Alert, undated), available at http://www.
swedishclub.com/upload/Loss_Prev_Docs/Piracy/PIRACY_and_USE
_OF_ARMED_GUARDS_-_General_overview.pdf (explaining that
ships must comply with different regulations and licensing schemes of
many different jurisdictions the ship will come into contract with).

100. UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 94(1).
101. Id. art. 17.
102. Id. art. 27.
103. See The Swedish Club, supra note 99, at 3–5 (outlining considerations
and suggestions to be taken into account when deciding if armed guards
can be on merchant ships).
104. See id.
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As countries begin to understand the importance of free market
private security measures, they are changing laws to enable flagships
to carry guns for protection against pirates. 105 Spain was one of the
first countries to allow fishing boats to carry heavy weapons.106
Similarly, the United Kingdom, 107 Germany, 108 and the United
States 109 have followed suit by making changes to their respective gun
laws. In addition, the International Chamber of Shipping expressed its
support for the use of armed guards off the coast of Somalia,
significantly bolstering support for changing gun laws. 110
Security companies work to define their services within the
confines of the law. For example, one company uses a helicopter to
drop a bundle of guns on a ship once the ship reaches international
waters. 111 Before the ship leaves international waters, the crew throws
the guns overboard. 112 Companies adopt this counterintuitive
approach because it is more economical to toss guns into the sea and
abide by the law than risk traveling without protection from
pirates. 113 Another company adopted a similar model, but instead of
105. See infra Appendix A.
106. See Analia Murias, Heavy Weapons Allowed in Tuna Fishing Vessels in
the Indian Ocean, FISH INFO. SERVS. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://fis.
com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthye
ar=&day=&id=46378&ndb=1&df=0 (noting fishers could previously
carry 7.62mm weapons on tuna boats but that has now been upped to
12.70mm weapons).
107. See Somali Piracy: Armed Guards to Protect UK Ships, BBC, Oct. 30,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-15510467 (noting Britain wants to
make it legal to carry guns only through dangerous waters).
108. See Bolsover, supra note 81 (saying that Germany is responding to the
hijackings by legalizing armed guards on ships).
109. See Shapiro, supra note 84. The Somalia Report first leaked the
unclassified internal memo from Hillary Clinton that stated the United
States’ support for armed security guards on commercial vessels. Robert
Young Pelton, U.S. Goes Public with Support for Hired Guns Against
Piracy, GCAPTAIN (Nov. 12, 2011), http://gcaptain.com/u-s-publicsupport-hired-guns?33792.
110. See Piracy: Issues Arising From the Use of Armed Guards, INCE &
CO. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://incelaw.com/misc/Piracy-issues-arising-fromthe-use-of-armed-guards/Piracy-Issues-arising-from-the-use-of-armedguards. The Internal Chamber of Shipping Commerce is a trade
association for the shipping industry and is involved in many
international bodies including the IMO. See Home, INT’L CHAMBER OF
SHIPPING, http://www.ics-shipping.org/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
111. See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9. Territorial waters extend 12 nautical
miles off the baseline of the country at which point the sea becomes
international waters. UNCLOS, supra note 97, art. 3.
112. See Piracy Panelist, supra note 9.
113. See id.

557

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Lending an “Invisible Hand” to the Navy

throwing the guns overboard it sends ships to retrieve the guns from
the ship that is leaving international waters and entering territorial
waters. 114
While both types of companies provide a way for shippers to
protect themselves, many pirate attacks occur in territorial waters.115
In order for armed guards to provide the necessary protection against
pirates, the laws of the coastal and flag countries need to allow
merchant ships to hire armed guards. Countries need to amend their
maritime law so ships can be protected in all seas, whether territorial
or international. Countries can then continue to control safety in
territorial waters through regulations 116 and licensing schemes. 117
2.

In order for armed guards to protect against piratical acts, selfdefense must be a viable defense.

Only a country may use force, not private citizens. 118 However,
when a state is unable to protect its citizens, its “monopoly of force”
gives way to the private citizen’s ability to protect their own
property. 119 The military controls force at sea, 120 but in the military’s
absence commercial ships should be able to protect against pirates. In
order for armed guards to adequately protect ships, the law of selfdefense must be applicable. 121 While the IMO recognizes the use of
firearms by private security guards, 122 the applicability of self-defense

114. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
115. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5; see also infra Appendix B
(explaining select countries current regulations regarding armed guards
in ports and territorial waters).
116. See Richard, supra note 35, at 454–55 (explain that countries can
manage the risk of allowing guns on ships by establishing regulations
and punishments for violations of the regulations).
117. See The Swedish Club, supra note 99, at 4 (noting that some countries
already have licensing schemes in place).
118. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 18 (1998).
119. Id.
120. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, Law Professor, Northwestern
University (Jan. 15, 2012).
121. See id. (explaining that in most situations where a armed guard kills a
pirate, self-defense is not applicable).
122. See IMO, Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, Ship Operators, and
Shipmasters on the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, annex, § 3.5, U.N.
Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1405/Rev.1 (Sep. 16, 2011) (“[Private Maritime
Security Companies] should require that their personnel not use firearms
against persons except in self-defence or defence of others against the
imminent threat of death or serious injury, or to prevent the
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is not clear. Many countries have narrow laws that do now allow selfdefense to be applicable for armed security guards. 123 For instance, an
armed guard on a German flagship who kills a pirate trying to take
over the ship may not be able to successfully argue self-defense.124
Without self-defense, armed guards will be more apprehensive in using
an appropriate amount of force to fight off pirates. Armed guards
must be able to protect ships from being overtaken with the use of an
appropriate amount of force.
While international law recognizes a general human right to selfdefense, there is no unified understanding of self-defense. 125 The
International Court of Justice addressed the use of force by state
actors against another state, but it did not address non-state actors
on the high seas. 126 Armed security guards would not be considered
state actors, even if a country licenses their security guards. 127 A
licensing scheme is a country’s way of meeting their “duty of due
diligence” to protect others from potentially dangerous situations and
is not providing a “convenience” for the country to use unlawful
force. 128
The UN Charter recognizes a right to self-defense, 129 but the
Human Rights Council advocates for a restriction on the private use
of firearms, hindering the ability of people to defend themselves.130
perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to
life.”) [hereinafter Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners].
123. See Bolsover, supra note 81.
124. See id.
125. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining that
in most situations, self-defense would not be applicable); see generally
David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of
Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43 (2007) (examining the legal status of
self-defense and international laws for self-defense).
126. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 146 (June 27) (rejecting “the justification of
collective self-defence maintained by the United States of America in
connection with the military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua the subject of this case”).
127. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Shooting Fishermen Mistaken for Pirates:
Jurisdiction, Immunity and State Responsibility, EJIL: TALK! (Mar. 2,
2012), http://www.ejiltalk.org/shooting-fishermen-mistaken-for-piratesjurisdiction-immunity-and-state-responsibility/. For example, the United
States is not responsible if a citizen uses a gun they have a license for
when they kill a foreign citizen. Id.
128. See id.
129. U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence. . . .”).
130. See UN Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Adoption of the Report on the Fifty-eighth
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Furthermore, the Council’s opinion is that even the strictest gun laws
in the United States, such as those in Washington, D.C. and New
York City, are not sufficient. 131 The Council states that “[t]he
intentional lethal use of small arms may only be made when strictly
unavoidable in order to protect life.” 132 “Strictly unavoidable” 133 is a
very high burden that will be difficult to meet.
Laws governing self-defense vary greatly from country to
country 134 For example, a woman in China was found not guilty of
murder and to have acted in self-defense when she chased down and
ran over robbers with her car. 135 On the other hand, the United
Kingdom is clarifying its self-defense law so that homeowners can use
force against burglars entering their homes. 136 This clarification
excludes homeowners from using self-defense if the burglar flees from
their home or if the homeowner was protecting a friend. 137 Clearly, the
actions found to be self-defense by the woman in China would not be
protected in the United Kingdom.
The United States is particularly pro-self-defense. The U.S.
support of self-defense policies is entrenched in the society’s pro-gun
policies, which started with the Second Amendment. 138 Pro-gun
Session to the Human Rights Council, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/Sub.1/58/L.11/Add.1 (Aug. 24, 2006) (stating that firearms
themselves can be a human rights violation).
131. See Kopel,, Gallant & Eisen, supra note 125, at 45.
132. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 128, ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
133. See id.
134. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120. Professor
Kontorovich explained the difference between the United States and
England by saying that if someone has a gun to your head in England
and demands your wallet, you hand the criminal your wallet. The
United States does not require handing over the wallet. Id.
135. See
Li
Shigong,
Are
There
Limits
to
Self—Defense?,
BEIJINGREVIEW.COM (Apr. 30, 2009), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/for
um/txt/2009-04/28/content_ 193066.htm (reporting how the court
found that after the two men had stolen the women’s purse containing
the equivalent of U.S. $11,720, the woman was justified in claiming selfdefense because the men’s flight was a part of the robbery).
136. See Right to Self-Defense in Homes to be “Much Clearer,” BBC, June
29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13957587 (noting that
even though England recognizes self-defenses as a defense at common
law, previous doubt in the self-dense laws in the context of protecting
one’s home must be clarified through legislative action).
137. See id.
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“[T]he right of the people to keep and bear
arms shall not be infringed.”). See also Sam Bateman, Riding Shotgun:
Armed Security Guards Onboard Merchant Ships 1 (S. Rajaratnam
School of International Studies Commentary, Mar. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0282010.pdf
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policies are still especially popular. 139 In the United States, citizens
enjoy a broadly protected right to self-defense. 140 The Model Penal
Code, which has greatly influenced criminal law in most jurisdictions
in the United States, 141 describes self-defense as “the use of force upon
or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the
present occasion.” 142
Without well-defined, unified self-defense laws, armed guards will
have a more difficult time protecting against pirates. The guards will
either not understand when they can and cannot use force, 143 or,
because of the lack applicable self-defense laws, they will be unable to
protect the ships. Just as countries need to change their laws to be
more open to allowing guns on their flag-ships and in their ports, selfdefense laws must change as well.

(noting that the United States’ history of pro-gun rights resulted from
the frontier and revolutionary era in America).
139. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (deciding
that an individuals have the right to bear arms and this right is
unconnected to the militia service). See also Bateman, supra note 138,
at 1 (noting that the United States’ history of pro-gun rights is still
defended even with the United States high rate of gun violence). But see
About Us, BRADY CAMPAIGN, http://www.bradycampaign.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (arguing that citizens have a “right to live
free from the threat of gun violence” and advocating for more gun
regulation).
140. See, e.g., State v. Singleton, 974 A.2d 679, 688–89 (Conn. 2009) (noting
that the defendant must only meet the burden of production with
regards to self-defense; then the state then must disprove self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt); McEwen v. State, 695 N.E.2d 79, 90 (Ind.
1998) (finding that when the defense present supporting evidence for a
claim of self-defense, the state must negate one of the necessary
elements of self-defense).
141. Paul H. Robinson & Markus Dirk Dubber, An Introduction to the
Model Penal Code 5–8 (Mar. 12, 1999), available at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf (explaining the
influence of the Model Penal Code on the different States’ criminal
systems).
142. MODEL PENAL CODE §
not serve as the law
legislatures in enacting
KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL,
(2005).

3.04 (1985). While the Model Penal Code does
of any jurisdiction, it influences and guides
their own jurisdictions laws. KATE E. BLOCH &
CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 7

143. This can depend on the laws of their flagship or the laws of the
territorial waters they have entered as discussed in supra part III.
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B.

A Collective International Response Must Support the Free Market
Assistance of Private Security Companies and Armed Guards.

In order for armed guards to protect merchant nations should
adopt a collective approach in outlining regulations under which ships
desiring to hire armed security guards should operate. 144 With private
security companies from one country on a ship flagged in another
country and a crew from a third, shipping companies and private
security companies struggle to keep up with all applicable
regulations. 145 A unified standard will help ships travelling to several
ports on the same trip to ensure compliance with all regulations.146
Without a unified standard, the assistance of private security
companies will be more difficult. There are two important collective
responses necessary for these advances in maritime security. First, the
United Nations must affirm support for shipping companies to employ
armed guards and create guidelines for such employment. Second,
navies must improve communication with shipping companies in an
effort to defuse piracy more quickly and protect the world economy.
1.

The United Nations must affirmatively support a ship’s choice to
utilize the security companies and armed guards to protect against
pirates.

As a specialized agency of the United Nations, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) 147 is in the best position to create
cohesive standards so private security companies can more easily
provide merchant ships with armed security guards. 148 The Geneva
144. See Bento, supra note 20, at 415 (noting that the high sea is owned
collectively by counties and thus a collective response is most
appropriate). See also Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note
120 (discussing how it would be helpful to have international
guidelines).
145. See JOHN S. BURNETT, DANGEROUS WATERS: MODERN PIRACY AND
TERROR ON THE HIGH SEAS 160 (2003) (referring to a “typical case”
being one where “[a] ship built in Japan, owned by a brass-plate
company in Malta, controlled by an Italian, managed by a company in
Cyprus, chartered by the French, skippered by a Norwegian, crewed by
Indians, registered in Panama, financed by a British bank, carrying a
cargo owned by a multinational oil company, is attacked while
transiting an international waterway in Indonesian territory and
arrested in the Philippines”).
146. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (discussing how
it would be helpful to have international guidelines).
147. Introduction to the IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo
.org/About/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
148. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (discussing the
IMO’s ability to be the organizational body to provide unified
standards).
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Convention established the IMO in 1948 to promote maritime
safety. 149 Currently, the IMO has 170 members and three associate
members, seventy-eight international non-governmental organizations
in
consultative
status,
and
sixty-three
intergovernmental
organizations with agreements of co-operation. 150 The IMO boasts
that the “best way of improving safety at sea is by developing
international regulations.” 151 Additionally, the organization is already
involved in piracy prevention. 152
The IMO does not presently support armed guards on ships, but
it does provide some guidelines for ships that are considering or that
have hired private security companies and armed guards. 153 The IMO
has written guidelines for ship owners, 154 flagships countries, 155 and for
port and coastal countries. 156 The guidelines for ship owners regarding
security companies are the most extensive of the three drafted
guidelines. 157 Some of the guidelines include performing a risk analysis,
researching security companies, requesting documents from potential
private security companies, and analyzing insurance policies, along
149. History of IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About
/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
150. Membership, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Membe
rship/Pages/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
151. History of IMO, supra note 140.
152. Frequently Asked Questions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.
org/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx#18 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013) (answering
the question “What is the IMO doing about piracy?”).
153. See Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122, annex ¶ 1
(explaining that because shipping companies may not find reliable
private security companies, the IMO will not endorse their use but their
popularity necessities the IMO’s guidelines).
154. See id. annex (outlining guidelines for shipping companies to take when
decided to hire private security companies to provide armed guards).
155. See generally IMO, Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States
Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on
Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO Doc. MSC.1/Circ.1406/Rev.1
(Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag
States] (noting that flag countries also need to address the use of armed
guards on their ships).
156. See generally IMO, Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal
States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security
Personnel on Board Ships in the High Risk Area, IMO. Doc.
MSC.1/Circ.1408
(Sept.
16,
2011)
[hereinafter
Interim
Recommendations for Port and Coastal States] (outlining the
regulations coastal countries need to address because of the movement
towards armed security guards).
157. See id.; Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122,
annex; Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States, supra note
155, annex.
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with other general precautionary evaluations before they decide to
hire armed security guards. 158
The IMO guidelines for port and coastal countries are very
general. 159 While the IMO recognizes the need for states to have
embarkment, disembarkment, and vessel calling requirements, it has
not suggested a unified international standard. 160 For instance, a
merchant ship traveling to numerous countries will have to conduct
extensive research to ensure compliance with each individual
country’s regulations. One small mistake could lead to a very costly
arms law violation. 161
The IMO’s recommendations for flag countries do not address any
particular laws regarding guns on flagships. 162 The recommendation
only says that the ship’s owners need to be aware of flag countries
laws and that the flag countries need to address whether the ships can
have armed guards on their ships. 163 The recommendation warns flag
countries about the escalation of violence in an encounter with pirates
as a result of having guns on the ships. 164 However, this is a concern
based on an inaccurate comparison of the private armed guards with
the private security guards in Iraq and Afghanistan. 165
Even though the member states of the IMO are reluctant to
endorse a ship’s employment of armed guards, 166 the organization
should support the shipping companies’ ability to choose to hire

158. See generally Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 122,
annex (outlining guidelines for merchant shipping companies considering
private security companies with armed guards to take).
159. See Interim Recommendations for Port and Coastal States, supra note
156, annex (outlining only what countries should address, not any
specifics about how to address them or recommendations on what the
regulations should be).
160. See id. (failing to provide any specifics about how to address issues or
recommendations on what the regulations should be).
161. For example, yachtsman Chris Packer was charged with gun running in
Indonesia for having guns to protect against pirates. See Velleco, supra
note 5.
162. See Revised Interim Recommendations for Flag States, supra note 155,
annex § 1.
163. See id. annex §§ 2, 4–5.
164. See id. annex § 3(encouraging the countries to account the possibility of
violence escalating because of guns on ships).
165. See infra part IV(C).
166. See Revised Interim Guidance to Shipowners, supra note 155, annex §
1(explaining that because shipping companies may not find reliable
private security companies, the IMO will not endorse their use).

564

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Lending an “Invisible Hand” to the Navy

armed guards. 167 The best approach for the IMO is to consider
regulations by consulting those that the regulations will affect. 168 For
example, it is important for companies that operate ships to be able
to weigh in on what is feasible, for the security companies to attest to
the strengths and weaknesses of the security teams, and for the
coastal countries to express concerns about gun safety. The IMO
should start this process with the Maritime Safety Committee, which
has started to address piracy. 169 With the help of the committee’s
research and recommendations, the IMO member states can support
unified regulations and adopt these regulations. 170 With unified
regulations in place, shipping companies will be able to more carefully
and efficiently ensure compliance with all laws and regulations
applicable to the merchant ships they have been hired to protect ships
in transit through dangerous, pirate-rich waters.
2.

The individual state navies and the coalition navies must utilize
assistance from security companies.

Worldwide, navies cannot adequately protect merchant ships from
piracy, 171 but the more ships the navies have, the more “eyes” they
have on the water, and the more effectively they can combat piracy.172
When security companies employ armed guards to traverse waters,
the companies also monitor pirate activity. Right now, navies underutilize the knowledge security companies can provide. 173 With navies
and security companies working together, the navies’ ability to
pinpoint pirates will be greatly increased and the efforts to defeat
piracy can become more effective.
167. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (addressing the
fact that some shipping companies do not want armed security guards
on their ships).
168. See id. (explaining that the shipping companies should be involved in
the creation of regulations).
169. See Structure of the IMO, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www
.imo.org/About/Pages/Structure.aspx#3 (last visited Mar. 9. 2013)
(listing the different IMO committees); see also Revised Interim
Recommendations for Flag States, supra note 155, annex § 3 (noting the
Maritime Safety Committee’s
involvement in creating the
recommendations).
170. The IMO could adopt these regulations through a number of means
including a convention or an amendment to a convention. See
Conventions, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/About/Conven
tions/Pages/Home.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
171. See supra Part III.
172. See Houreld, supra note 86 (explaining the support for private security
companies in joining the fight against piracy).
173. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
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The U.S. Department of Justice created a report addressing a
partnership between law enforcement and private security. 174 Even
though this report was intended to assist in collaboration for
community security efforts, 175 the analysis can easily be transferred to
the efforts between the navies and private security companies
combating piracy. The report outlines five important steps needed to
enhance this partnership: 1) improve the communication process; 2)
improve the content of the communication; 3) improve training
content; 4) facilitate personal contacts among the membership; and 5)
find out what other law enforcement-private security partnerships are
doing.176 These steps identify how navies and private security
companies can create their own partnership to protect the high seas
from the terror of piracy.
C.
1.

Criticism Falls Short

Allowing armed guards on ships will not lead to more shooting.

Critics worry that armed security guards will create a “Wild
West” at sea. 177 Pirates already come aboard with “guns blazing,” in
order to stop the ship and board it more easily. 178 Critics say that if
security guards resemble the “trigger-happy” security members in Iraq
and Afghanistan who do not understand the “rules of engagement,”
then they will quickly fire back at the pirates. 179 The exchange will
result in a quickly-escalated, deadly exchange of gunfire. 180
This argument fails for two reasons. First, critics cannot
adequately compare the troubles of the security companies’ “trigger-

174. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE LAW ENFORCEMENT-PRIVATE
SECURITY CONSORTIUM, OPERATION PARTNERSHIPS: TRENDS AND
PRACTICES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PRIVATE SECURITY
COLLABORATIONS (2009) (analyzing the work of law enforcement and
private security companies so that they might work together to ensure
community safety).
175. See id. at 5 (explaining the purpose of the report).
176. See id. at 116 (creating these steps based on the exercise of law
enforcement officers and private security contractors after conducting
studies, focus groups, and interviews).
177. See Houreld, supra note 86.
178. See id. (explaining how pirates fire at the bridge of the ship in order to
get the ship to slow down or stop so that the pirates can board it).
179. See id. (referring to the security companies in Iraq and Afghanistan
blaming their operators for its negative reputation).
180. See Most Ship Owners Still Reluctant to Arm Crews, MSNBC (Apr. 9,
2009),jhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30141951/ns/world_newsafrica/t/most-ship-owners-still-reluctant-arm-crews/#.TqC3Ut4Uqso.
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happy” armed guards in Iraq and Afghanistan 181 with the security
guards on merchant ships. While the security companies in the
Middle East have quasi-governmental control and act as soldiers, the
guards on merchant ships act as watchmen. 182 This is a much safer,
lower-intensity job. 183 Private armed security guards create an
intimidating presence, which deters pirate activity, much like the
effect of a private security guard at a bank or jewelry store. 184
The armed security guards on merchant ships are not at war with
pirates. 185 Despite the classic view of pirates as hostis humani generis
(an enemy of human kind), pirates more closely resemble criminals
than combatants. 186 Pirates generally rob, pillage, and hold hostages
for ransom for economic gain. 187 If the laws of war applied, pirates
would either have to be treated as combatants, which would
legitimatize lethal force, or as civilians which would hinder actions to
defeat piracy. 188 The rules of engagement do not appropriately address
the laws governing the use of force in these incidences. 189
Second, the weapons carried by armed guards present problems.190
Armed guards are often only given shotguns in order to comply with
the laws of the flagship and the ports. 191 Shotguns are no match for
the pirates’ long-range heavy weaponry that can fire 600 rounds per
minute. 192 By equipping armed guards with the right weapons, the
181. See Houreld, supra note 86 (referring to the security companies in Iraq
and Afghanistan blaming their operators for its negative reputation).
182. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining how
the operations of a security company in Iraq and Afghanistan do not
resemble the security companies operation on a merchant ship at sea).
183. See id.
184. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
185. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (explaining how
the operations of a security company in Iraq and Afghanistan do not
resemble the security companies operation on a merchant ship at sea).
186. See Guilfoyle, supra note 127 (explaining the difference between
describing pirates as combatants and describing pirates as criminals).
187. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 9–12 (explaining the economic
gains of piracy).
188. See Guilfoyle, supra note 127 (noting the harms of treating pirates as
combatants).
189. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra note 120 (saying that
“rules of engagement” is not correct because this is not a time of war).
190. See Most Ship Owners Still Reluctant to Arm Crews, supra note 180
(noting that the guns that comply with laws in different ports are
generally short range and traditionally used for bird control).
191. See id.
192. See id.
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armed guards will deter pirates from attacking the ship. 193 When
pirates see armed guards onboard ships, they will pass by and look for
an easier victim. 194
In order to further address the critics’ fears, government
regulations can mitigate the risk of unwarranted violence. 195 For
example, regulations about the appropriate use of force must be
agreed upon and put in place by an organization such as the IMO.
These regulations could provide for both simulated and classroom
training. Upon completion of such training, a regulatory board could
issue the armed guard with a license to serve as security on a
merchant ship. With unified regulatory measures in place, armed
guards will be able to serve as watchmen and protectors of merchant
ships, fending off piracy with the appropriate amount of force.
2.

Ports will not be more dangerous if armed guards carrying guns are
allowed into ports.

Governments are concerned about the loyalty of foreign private
security personnel in territorial waters and ports. 196 Some in the
international community fear another Captain Kidd and the
Adventure Galley incident in which a private contractor hired to
combat piracy decided to turn to piracy himself. 197 Captain Kidd stole
the ship and equipment provided to him by the state and resorted to
the very career he was hired to defeat. 198
Academics have confidence that security personnel will remain
loyal. 199 In this modern era, security companies boast professionalism

193. See Velleco, supra note 5; Interview with Michael Newton, Law
Professor, Vanderbilt University, in Cleveland, OH (Nov. 11, 2011)
(noting how “‘gun-free zones’ simply make easy targets for criminals”).
194. See, e.g., Live Piracy Report: Armed Guards Thwart Attack Attempt,
NEPTUNE MARITIME SECURITY (Jan. 24, 2012), http://neptunemaritime
security.posterous.com/live-piracy-report-armed-guards-thwart-attack8200.
195. See Richard, supra note 35, at 454–55 (explaining how governments
could put in place regulatory controls that the security companies must
follow, and if these regulations are not followed, the government would
impose consequences).
196. See Gordon Corera, Analysis: Somali Piracy: Armed Guards to Protect
UK Ships, BBC, Oct. 30, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk15510467.
197. See Richard, supra note 35, at 412–13. In 1696, the Adventure Galley, a
merchant ship, was fitted with guns and weapons to hunt down pirates.
After being unsuccessful, Captain Kidd resorted to piracy. Id.
198. See id.
199. See Interview with Michael Newton, supra note 193; Interview with
LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
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and maritime skills. 200 Countries can protect their interests by
requiring security guards to obtain licenses and pay licensing fees. 201
For example, Djibouti requires security companies to obtain
licenses. 202 Countries can also put other regulations in place such as
requiring ships to place guns in a locker when a ship pulls into
port. 203 Officials from the port country can then check and secure the
lockers once the ship has arrived in port. 204
3.

Armed guards are not mercenaries.

Some critics feel hired armed guards on merchant ships qualify as
mercenaries under international law, but this is untrue. Article 47 of
the Geneva Convention defines a mercenary as a person who is
recruited to fight in armed conflict that does not belong to a party of
the conflict or the forces of that party, has not been sent by the state,
and is motivated by private gain to fight. 205 Critics object to armed
200. The International Association for Maritime Security Professionals
provides a code of practice and a Constitution for the Industry. See
Membership Criteria, INT’L ASSOC. FOR MARITIME SECURITY
PROFESSIONALS,jhttp://iamsponline.org/membership/membershipcriteria/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2013). With the current world trend to
downsize militaries, security companies hire former Marines who bring
professionalism and maritime security knowledge from their previously
serves in the military. See Interview with Eugene Kontorovich, supra
note 120.
201. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
202. See id. (noting one country that already requires licensing). Criticism
emerged when rumors circulated that Djibouti licensed the troubled
security company Blackwater. See, e.g., Simon, Blackwater CounterPiracy in Djibouti, CROWDLEAKS, http://crowdleaks.org/blackwatercounter-piracy-in-djibouti/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011). However,
through two name changes and management turnover, the security
company bears little resemblance to the troubled company operating in
Iraq. Nathan Hodge, Company Once Known as Blackwater Ditches Xe
for Yet Another New Name, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577089021757
803802.html.
203. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72 (providing
other suggestions to ease countries’ anxiety about armed guards within
their ports).
204. See id.
205. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 47(2), Apr. 29, 2958, 450
U.N.T.S. 82. Article 47 provides:
A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf
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guards on merchant ships, claiming that armed security guards act as
mercenaries and that the function of using lethal force belongs to the
state alone. 206
Armed guards act as peacekeepers by deterring hostilities through
their intimidating presence. Private actors serving in a peacekeeping
role do not act for the state. 207 For instance, companies regularly hire
private guards to protect banks, museums, hospitals, and other
entities. 208 U.S. courts deem private police for these entities as state
actors when they have been entrusted with complete police
authority. 209 But when complete police power is not transferred to the
private police officer, courts hold the private police officer does not
act as a public actor. 210 For example, the Chicago Housing Authority
hired a security guard in Wade v. Byles to provide security services to
the residents of an apartment building. 211 The guard was authorized
to carry a handgun and use it in self-defense, but if trouble arose in
the lobby, the security guard was required to call the police. 212 The
security guard was not authorized to leave the lobby area in pursuit
of anyone. 213 The limited scope of the security guard’s authority
precluded him from being deemed a state actor. 214
Courts also note the legitimacy of a private security team’s
authority under the “shopkeepers privilege.” 215 Individuals have a
of a Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks
and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident
of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the
conflict on official duty as a member of its armed forces.
Id.
206. See, e.g., Bolsover, supra note 81 (noting the objection to armed guards
on merchant ships by the German Free Democrats Party).
207. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982)) (“The simple fact that a private
entity performs a function that serves the public does not transform its
conduct into state action.”).
208. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
209. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 428 F.3d 629, 637 (6th Cir. 2005).
210. Id.
211. Wade, 83 F.3d at 903.
212. Id. at 904.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 906.
215. Romanski v. Detroit Entm’t, L.L.C., 28 F.3d 629, 638 (6th Cir. 2005).
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right to protect personal property and are motivated to do so by selfinterest. 216 “A storekeeper’s central motivation in detaining a person
whom he believes to be in the act of stealing his property is selfprotection, not altruism.” 217 This self-interested act cannot be
attributed to the state action. 218
Unlike mercenaries who are recruited to fight offensively, armed
security guards are recruited to protect using defensive measures.219
Armed security guards do not engage pirates in war; they are
protecting ships from criminals. 220 Armed security guards should be
entrusted with limited powers like the armed guard in Wade v. Byles
whose scope of protection was limited to the lobby. 221 The armed
guards should be limited to protecting ships, and if hostilities arise,
then the armed guards should be required to call the proper
protective authority—a country’s navy. 222 Without full authority as a
state actor, the private security guards do not qualify as
mercenaries. 223

V. Conclusion
With a global economy that is highly dependent on the shipping
industry, piracy is a very serious problem in modern society. 224 The
world’s navies must continue efforts to protect against piracy. The
absence of a naval presence would cause an even greater resurgence of
pirate activity. 225 Piracy cannot be stopped by the efforts of navies
alone. The free market must be permitted to provide assistance.
Armed security guards can be an effective addition to navies in
achieving a solution to the piracy problem. Before this can happen
legal obstacles must be dismantled. The most appropriate and
effective way to do this is through a collaborative world effort. The
IMO’s authority in maritime safety makes it the perfect organization
216. See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 319 F.3d 825, 834 (6th Cir. 2003).
217. Id. (quoting White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1979))
(finding a Dillard’s security officer did not act as a state actor when he
stopped a customer suspected of shoplifting).
218. Id.
219. See Richard, supra note 35, at 461.
220. See id. at 462.
221. See Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir. 1996).
222. See id. (noting the security guards duty to call the police when a person
refused to leave the lobby of the residence).
223. See Richard, supra note 35, at 459.
224. See Daxecker & Prins, supra note 17, at 5 (noting that pirates create
devastating, worldwide impacts).
225. See Interview with LCDR Claude Berube, supra note 72.
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to initiate this effort. 226 With assistance from costal states, shipping
companies, flagship states, and security companies, the IMO’s
Maritime Safety Committee can create a set of guidelines to enable
merchant ships to hire armed security guards. These guidelines can
include protective measures such as licensing schemes and shipping
port regulations to ease critics’ fears about the potential dangers of
allowing armed security guards on merchant ships. 227 The guidelines
can then be adopted by the member states of the IMO and
implemented by each member country. 228 The implementation of these
regulations will equip armed security guards to assist the navies’
efforts. With these unified legal changes, ships that were previously
attacked, like the Maersk Alabama, will be able to utilize armed
security guards to deter and fend off pirates.

226. See History of IMO, supra note 149 (noting its involvement in
promoting safety at sea).
227. The IMO has already developed regulations including the Djibouti Code
of Conduct in its efforts against piracy. See Piracy and Armed Robbery
Against Ships, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org/Media
Centre/resources/Pages/Piracy-and-armed-robbery-against-ships.aspx
(last visited Mar. 9, 2013). The regulations developed by the IMO
regarding armed guards could resemble the adoption of the Djibouti
Meeting or be an addition to the Djibouti Code of Conduct. See
generally Djibouti Code of Conduct, INT;L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx
(last
visited Mar. 9, 2013). The regulations can also offer guidelines for
licensing schemes for private security companies, simulated and
classroom training for armed guards, and regulations for firearms in
ports.
228. See IMO Member States, INT’L MARITIME ORG., http://www.imo.org
/About/Membership/Pages/MemberStates.aspx (last visited Mar. 9,
2013) (listing the IMO member states).
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Appendix A: Regulations Regarding Armed Security
Guards’ Flagship Country
Country
Egypt
Germany
Greece
Italy
Japan
Liberia
Marshall Islands
Netherlands
Panama
South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Yemen

Can Flagships Have
Armed Security Guards?
Yes 229
Yes 230
Yes 231
Yes 232
No 233
Yes 234
Yes 235
No 236
Yes 237
Yes 238
Yes 239
Yes 240
No 241

229. Piracy: Somalia and the Gulf of Aden–Updates, NORTH (Nov. 21, 2011)
http://www.nepia.com/publications/industrynews/ships/africa/795/.
230. See Bolsover, supra note 81.
231. Greece Will Allow Armed Guards on Ships to Protect from Pirates,
DEFENCEWEB (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=21594:greece-will-allow-armedguards-on-ships-to-protect-from-pirates&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106.
232. Somali Piracy: 2011 Annual Update, STRATFOR GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE
(Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/somali-piracy-2011annual-update (allowing ships to rent military when they travel through
Somali pirate waters).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Somali Piracy: Somalia and the Gulf of Aden–Updates, supra note 226.
239. Somali Piracy: 2011 Annual Update, supra note 232 (allowing armed
guards in the Somali pirate region).
240. See Shapiro, supra note 84 (announcing support for armed security
guards for the protection against pirates).
241. Yemen Bans Armed Guards on Ships, ALSAHWA-YEMEN (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://www.alsahwa-yemen.net/arabic/subjects/5/2012/1/
19/15472.htm.
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APPENDIX B: REGULATIONS REGARDING THE ABILITY OF
ARMED SECURITY GUARDS TO ENTER TERRITORIAL
WATERS AND PORTS 242
Country

Port Regulations
•

Australia

•

•

Requires notification
regarding:
- when a ship intends
to enter or depart
from port;
- the flag country’s
authorization of
firearms;
- information on the
firearms onboard;
and
- information about
the armed guards,
for example the
armed guards must
have the
appropriate visa.
To embark or
disembark with
weapons is treated as
an import or export of
the weapons.
Possession and storage
requirements are
developed by the
Commonwealth and
State and Territory
legislation.

Territorial Water
Regulations
• Notification,
authorization,
and storage
information
regarding
firearms to
appropriate
agency is often
required.
• Security related
incidents in
territorial seas
must be
reported.

242. See Responses Received on PCASP, INT’L MARITIME ORG.,
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/piracyarmedrobbery/pages/respo
nses-received-on-private%20armed%20security.aspx (last visited Mar. 9,
2013) (posting the different questionnaries that have been returned to
the IMO).
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•

Brazil

•

•

France

Requires 72-hour notice
to the Brazilian Public
Authority of:
- the security team
and firearms on
board;
- authorization
documents for the
security team and
firearms from the
flag country;
- declaration of the
quantity and type of
firearms, including
the ammunition,
consumables, spare
parts, and
maintenance
equipment used by
the security team;
and
- a list of security
team members.
The embarkment or
disembarkment of
firearms is not allowed.

•

Requires 48 hour notice
to the CROSS Reunion
of the:
- date and estimated
arrival time of the
ship in the territorial
waters;
- planned date and
time of departure
from territorial
waters;
- complete list of
weapons and
ammunition kept on
board;

•

575

•

•

•

•

No requirements
for ships carrying
firearms leaving
a port.
A detailed
account of a
security related
incident must be
reported to the
Brazilian Public
Authority as
soon as the
incident occurs.

Same notification
requirements for
ships coming into
its port.
Armed persons
must not be
visible on the
exterior of the
ship.
Weapons and
ammunition
must be kept in
separate lockable
places.
Declaration of
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-

•

•

•

Hong Kong

•

•

•

Mauritius

identity of persons
responsible for
safekeeping and
name and address of
company to which
they belong.
No requirements
regarding notification of
flag country
authorization.
Regulations for
embarking and
disembarking with
weapons are “complex”
and the country is
evaluating the different
scenarios.
Requires 24-hour notice
to the Marine
Department of the Hong
Kong SAR regarding
information about
firearms and
ammunition.
The firearms and
ammunition must remain
on board in a locked
container while in port.
No requirements for
notification about the
members of the security
guard team.

Requires 24 hours
(preferably 48 hours)
notice to the Mauritius
Revenue Authority of:
- all the particulars of
the firearms, such as
model numbers,
serial numbers, and
caliber;

security incident
in territorial
waters must be
reported as soon
as the incident
happens. 243

•

Hong Kong has
no territorial
waters.

•

Foreign private
security
companies need
to obtain prior
authorization
from the
Government of
Mauritius to
operate in

243. These incidents could only occur because of non-compliance with
weapons regulations.
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-

•
•

•
•

the quantity and
type of ammunition;
- a list of guards with
their full names,
passport number,
and nationality;
- an authorization
letter from the
Commissioner of
Police for authorizing
transit and storage of
firearms and
ammunition through
territorial waters.
All weapons must be
stowed while the ship is
in port.
Embarkment and
disembarkment of
weapons from private
security guards is
allowed with written
authorization from the
Commissioner of Police
and with a list of the
firearms and
ammunition.
Flag country’s
authorization of the
weapons is required.
No notification
requirements.

•

•

•

Required to
report a security
incident to the
port facilities
immediately
after the incident
occurs.

•

No requirements
in place for
weapons on a
ship arriving or
departing from
ports.
Security
incidents must

Panama

•

Spain

•

Requires 24-hour notice
of weapons according to
Article 68.1 of the
Weapons Regulation.
No specific notification
required regarding the
private security team
onboard.

577

territorial waters
at least one
month in
advance.
The use of the
weapons is
prohibited in
territorial waters.
Any security
related incidents
in territorial
waters must be
reported as soon
as it occurs and
no later than
thirty minutes
after it occurs.

•
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•
•

•
•
United
States 244

No notification of flag
country authorization
required.
Embarkment is only
permitted for Spanish
private security
companies and for ships
traveling under the
Spanish flag.
Notification of firearms
held by private security
teams must be given.
Information regarding
the private security team
members must be given.

be reported as
soon as possible
and must include
an account of
facts, including
the weapons,
personnel, ship
and location of
the incident.
•

Incidents must
be reported to
the Customs
Boarder
Protection Port
Director as soon
as they occur
and must include
location of the
incident,
description of
what occurred,
and the parties
involved.

244. In the questionnaire, the United States referred the questions to the
appropriate departments of the government or regulations and did not
specifically answer the questions.
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